SUDANESE
PUBLIC OPINION MONITORING PLATFORM
The
Results of the Second Sudanese Public Opinion Poll: The Current Risks and
Priority Problems In Sudan
On June 25, 2022, the Sudanese Public Opinion Monitoring
Platform launched a survey to read public opinion trends in identifying
priority problems in Sudan today. The questionnaire presented 12 main problems,
including: the continuation of the military coup and the military takeover of
power, the economic crisis and its repercussions on livelihood, corruption, the
threat of famine, insecurity and Lawlessness, the risk of collision between the army and rapid
support forces, the multiplicity of armies and security forces in the country,
the differences between the civil political forces, Demonstrations and
processions, the absence of a legitimate and effective government to run the
country, the return of the Islamists to power, the increasing international
isolation or the return of sanctions against Sudan, in addition to the
possibility of suggesting other options by the participants.
The questionnaire required defining the geographical area for
each participant according to the following options: Khartoum, the states of
eastern Sudan (Kassala, Gedaref, the Red Sea), the states of Darfur (North,
Central, South, West, or East Darfur), Blue Nile, Kordofan states (North, West,
South Kordofan), central Sudan states (Al-Jazeera, White Nile, Sennar), and
outside Sudan.
Each participant was given the opportunity to choose three
options that reflect the current risks and priority problems in Sudan.
The survey lasted for 24 days and was distributed
electronically via Google Forms. A poll was conducted by 1010 participants from
different parts of Sudan, and the results were as follows:
The majority of respondents came from Khartoum state with
58.4%, followed by participants from outside Sudan with 20.79%, then Eastern
Sudan states with 11.88%, then Darfur with 3.96%, Blue Nile and Kordofan with
1.98 for each, and Central Sudan states with a percentage of 0.99% of participants.
The continuation of the military coup and the military
takeover of power topped the participants’ choices as the major risk facing
Sudan by 75.25%, followed by corruption at 46.53%, then the economic crisis and
its repercussions on livelihood by 38.61%, then the multiplicity of armies and
security forces in the country by 31.68%, then insecurity and lawlessness by
26.73%, followed by the risk of Islamists returning to power by 19.8%, then the
absence of a legitimate and effective government to run the country by 18.81%,
and the increase in international isolation and the possibility of the return
of sanctions on Sudan by 13.86% of the participants' choices. While 9.9%
identified the differences between the political forces as one of the risks and
problems facing Sudan, 7.92% of the participants chose famine, and the same
percentage (7.92%) identified the risk of collision between the army and the
rapid support force. While less than 1% of the participants identified the lack
of a comprehensive national vision, the monopoly of an unofficial body of the
country (RSF and Armed Movements), and demonstrations and protests as being among
the dangers facing the country.
The geographical distribution of each of the results was follows:
|
The continuation of the military
coup and the military takeover of power |
|
|
Khartoum |
60.53% |
|
Blue Nile |
2.63% |
|
outside Sudan |
23.68% |
|
Darfur States (North, Central, South, West, or East Darfur)) |
3.95% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala, Gedaref , Red Sea) |
7.89% |
|
Kordofan states (North, West, and South Kordofan ) |
1.32% |
|
The differences between civil political forces |
|
|
Khartoum |
60.00% |
|
outside Sudan |
30.00% |
|
Darfur States (North, Central,
South, West, or East Darfur) |
10.00% |
|
The economic crisis and its
repercussions on livelihood |
|
|
Khartoum |
69.23% |
|
outside Sudan |
15.38% |
|
Darfur States (North, Central, South, West, or East Darfur) |
7.69% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala, Gedaref , Red Sea)) |
7.69% |
|
Insecurity and Lawlessness |
|
|
Khartoum |
66.67% |
|
outside Sudan |
14.81% |
|
Eastern Sudan states )Kassala, Gedaref , Red Sea)) |
11.11% |
|
Kordofan states (North, West, and South Kordofan) |
7.41% |
|
Corruption |
|
|
Khartoum |
57.45% |
|
Blue Nile |
2.13% |
|
outside Sudan |
14.89% |
|
Darfur States (North, Central,
South, West, or East Darfur) |
4.26% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
17.02% |
|
Kordofan states (North, West, and
South Kordofan ) |
2.13% |
|
Central Sudan states (Gezira, White Nile,
Sennar) |
2.13% |
|
Demonstrations and Protests |
|
|
Khartoum |
100.00% |
|
The monopoly of an unofficial body of the
country (RSF and Armed Movements) |
|
|
Khartoum |
100.00% |
|
Increasing international isolation
or the return of sanctions against Sudan |
|
|
Khartoum |
50.00% |
|
outside Sudan |
21.43% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
21.43% |
|
Kordofan states (North, West, and
South Kordofan ) |
7.14% |
|
Multiple armies and security forces
in the country |
|
|
Khartoum |
59.38% |
|
outside Sudan |
25.00% |
|
Darfur States (North, Central,
South, West, or East Darfur) |
6.25% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
6.25% |
|
Central Sudan states (Gezira, White
Nile, Sennar) |
3.13% |
|
The risk of a collision between the army and rapid
support |
|
|
Khartoum |
37.50% |
|
outside Sudan |
25.00% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
37.50% |
|
The Risk of Famine |
|
|
Khartoum |
37.50% |
|
Blue Nile |
25.00% |
|
outside Sudan |
12.50% |
|
Darfur States (North, Central,
South, West, or East Darfur) |
12.50% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala, Gedaref
, Red Sea) |
12.50% |
|
The failure of actors, parties and
civil society organizations to have a commperhisive vision
|
|
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
100.00% |
|
Absence of a legitimate and effective government to run
the country |
|
|
Khartoum |
42.11% |
|
outside Sudan |
21.05% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
26.32% |
|
Kordofan states (North, West, and
South Kordofan ) |
5.26% |
|
Central Sudan states (Gezira, White
Nile, Sennar) |
5.26% |
|
The return of the Islamists
to
power |
|
|
Khartoum |
55.00% |
|
Blue Nile |
5.00% |
|
outside Sudan |
35.00% |
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala,
Gedaref , Red Sea) |
5.00% |
The
results for each geographic region are as follows:
·
•
In Khartoum, the continuation of the military coup and the military takeover of
power topped the participants' choices as the most dangerous risks facing Sudan
currently with a rate of 25.99%, followed by the choices of the economic crisis
and its repercussions on livelihood and corruption at 15.25% for each, then the
risks of the multiplicity of armies and military forces in the country at
10.73%.
|
Khartoum |
|
|
25.99% |
The continuation of the military coup and the military takeover of
power |
|
15.25% |
The economic
crisis and its repercussions on livelihood |
|
15.25% |
corruption |
|
10.73% |
Multiple armies
and security forces in the country |
|
10.17% |
Insecurity and insecurity |
|
6.21% |
The return of
the Islamists to power |
|
4.52% |
Absence of a legitimate and effective government to run
the country |
|
3.95% |
Increasing
international isolation or the return of sanctions against Sudan |
|
3.39% |
The difference between civil political forces |
|
1.69% |
The danger of a
collision between the army and rapid support |
|
1.69% |
risk of Famine |
|
0.56% |
Demonstrations
and protests |
|
0.56% |
The monopoly of
an unofficial body of the country (RSF and Armed Movements) |
• In
Blue Nile, the participants’ choices were limited to the continuation of the
military coup by 33.3 %, the risk of Famine with the same rate of 33.3%,
corruption with 16.67%, and the return of the Islamists to power by 16.67%.
|
Blue Nile |
|
|
33.33% |
The continuation of the
military coup and the military takeover of power |
|
33.33% |
risk of famine |
|
16.67% |
corruption |
|
16.67% |
The return of the Islamists to power |
• In
the states of Darfur, a quarter of the respondents identified the continuation
of the military coup and the economic crisis and its repercussions on
livelihood as the most serious risks facing Sudan. This was followed by
corruption with a rate of 16.67%, and the multiplicity of armies and security
forces in the country with the same percentage of 16.67%.
|
Darfur States (North, Central, South, West, or East Darfur)) |
|
|
25.00% |
The continuation of the
military coup and the military takeover of power |
|
25.00% |
The economic crisis and its
repercussions on livelihood |
|
16.67% |
corruption |
|
16.67% |
Multiple armies and security
forces in the country |
|
8.33% |
The differences between civil political
forces |
|
8.33% |
risk of famine |
• In
the states of eastern Sudan (Kassala, Gedaref , Red Sea) , corruption topped
the participants’ choices by 22.22%, followed by the continuation of the
military coup and the military takeover of power by 16.67%, then the absence of
a legitimate and effective government to run the country by 13.89%.
|
Eastern Sudan states (Kassala, Gedaref , Red Sea) |
|
|
22.22% |
corruption |
|
16.67% |
The continuation of the
military coup and the military takeover of power |
|
13.89% |
Absence of a legitimate and effective government to run
the country |
|
8.33% |
The economic crisis and its
repercussions on livelihood |
|
8.33% |
Insecurity |
|
8.33% |
Increasing international
isolation or the return of sanctions against Sudan |
|
8.33% |
The risks of a collision between the army and rapid
support |
|
5.56% |
Multiple armies and security
forces in the country |
|
2.78% |
risk of famine |
|
2.78% |
The lack of a comperhinsive national vision |
|
2.78% |
The return of the Islamists to power |
• In
the states of Kordofan , the risks of lawlessness and insecurity topped the
participants’ choices by 33.33%, while the rest of the options were divided
into the continuation of the military coup and the military takeover of power,
corruption, increasing international isolation or the return of sanctions
against Sudan, and the absence of a legitimate and effective government at a
rate of 16.67% for each of them.
|
Kordofan states (North, West, and South Kordofan ) |
|
|
33.33% |
Insecurity and Lawlessness |
|
16.67% |
The continuation of the military
coup and the military takeover of power |
|
16.67% |
corruption |
|
16.67% |
Increasing international
isolation or the return of sanctions against Sudan |
|
16.67% |
Absence of a legitimate and effective
government to run the country |
• In
the states of Central Sudan, the participants’ choices were equally limited to
corruption, the multiplicity of armies and security forces in the country and
the absence of a legitimate and effective government, at a rate of 33.33%.
|
Central Sudan states (Gezira, White Nile, Sennar) |
|
|
33.33% |
corruption |
|
33.33% |
Multiple armies and security
forces in the country |
|
33.33% |
Absence of a legitimate and effective government to run
the country |
• From
outside Sudan, the risk of the continuation of the military coup and the
military takeover of power topped the participants’ choices by 28%, while the
multiplicity of armies and security forces in the country came in second with
12.7%, then corruption and the risk of the return of the Islamists to power by
11.11%.
|
outside Sudan |
|
|
28.57% |
The continuation of the
military coup and the military takeover of power |
|
12.70% |
Multiple armies and security
forces in the country |
|
11.11% |
corruption |
|
11.11% |
The return of the Islamists to power |
|
9.52% |
The economic crisis and its
repercussions on livelihood |
|
6.35% |
Insecurity and Lawlessness |
|
6.35% |
Absence of a legitimate and effective government to run
the country |
|
4.76% |
The differences between civil political
forces |
|
4.76% |
Increasing international
isolation or the return of sanctions against Sudan |
|
3.17% |
The danger of a collision
between the army and rapid support |
|
1.59% |
risk of Famine |
The platform welcomes any inquiries or
suggestions for upcoming surveys on its e-mail:
